THE CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES.
The phrase "questions of a legal nature" is employed in the
Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
of i899 and 1907, as well as in the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, to denote disputes considered specially suited for arbitration.
This naturally implies a general understanding, at least, of
what is meant by legal disputes and, conversely, what questions
are to be included under the designation of politicaldisputes. As
a matter of fact, however, the classification of international disputes is one of the most difficult problems in international law.
It lies at the very basis of obligatory arbitration. Nations solicitous of their essential interests and conscious of the sanctity of
treaty engagements are unwilling to pledge themselves by vague
general clauses that may entail more than they are willing or
able to fulfill. Roosevelt vigorously stated this fact in commenting on the treaties of arbitration negotiated in I911 by the United
States with Great Britain and France:
"It would be not merely foolish but wicked for us as a
Nation to agree to arbitrate any dispute that affects our vital
interest or our independence or our honor; because such an
agreement would amount on our part to a covenant to abandon our duty, to an agreement to surrender the rights of the
American people about unknown matters at unknown times
in the future. Such an agreement would be wicked if kept,
and yet to break it-as it undoubtedly would be broken if
the occasion arose-would be only less shameful than keeping it.

.

.

Of course the same reasons which make it

impossible to agree to arbitrate questions that involve our
vital interest, independence, or honor, apply to any proposal
to submit to others the question whether or not a given dispute of such a kind is 'justiciable,' or does or does not involve such questions and therefore should or should not be
arbitrated." 1.
'In the Outlook for igir, p. 565.
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The Hague Conference of 1907 fully realized the importance
of this problem of the classification of international controversies.
The First Commission and Subcommission organized for the
purpose devoted many weeks to the task. The practical results
were negative but the discussions were of immense value in bringing into high relief the principal aspects of the problem.
An attempt was made to secure an agreement on a list of
subjects which might be recognized as being peculiarly suitable
for arbitration. On only eight out of thirty questions thus submitted was it possible to secure a majority. The vote on the
following seven subjects was thirty-one in favor, eight against,
and five not voting:
Reciprocal free aid to the indigent sick.
International protection of workmen.
Means of preventing collisions at sea.
Weights and measures.
Measurement of vessels.
Wages and estates of deceased seamen.
Disputes concerning pecuniary claims for damages when
the principle of indemnity is recognized by the parties.
On the subject of the protection of literary and artistic works
the vote was twenty-six in favor, nine against, and nine not
voting.
It would be difficult to conceive of subjects more innocuous
or "anodyne," as one of the delegates at this conference characterized this list, questions less likely to cause serious discussion or controversy. Not only was unanimity impossible, but
thirteen nations out of forty-four were either opposed to, or
refrained from voting on the first seven; and eighteen nations
were either opposed to or refrained from voting on the other
question.
This is all the more significant when one recalls the fact
that these votes were not in open conference and were distinctly
understood to have no binding force whatever, being subject to
further review before formal adoption.
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It is of interest to note also the nature of the other subjects
which were unable to command a majority of votes in the Subcommission:
Regulation of commercial and industrial companies.
In cases of pecuniary claims arising from acts of war, civil
war or the arrest of foreigners or the seizure of their
property.
Sanitary regulations.
Equality of foreigners and nationals as to taxes and imposts.Customs tariffs.
Regulations concerning epizooty, phylloxera, and other similar pestilences.
Monetary systems.
Right of foreigners to acquire and hold property.
Civil and commercial procedure.In case of pecuniary claims involving the interpretation of
application of conventions of every kind between the
parties in dispute.
Conventions providing for repatriation.
Postal, telegraph, and telephone conventions.
Taxes against vessels (dock charges, lighthouse and pilot
dues), salvage charges and taxes imposed in case of
damage or shipwreck.
International private law.
Patents, trade-marks, and trade name.
Geodetic questions.
Emigration.
It is instructive also to note the votes in the Subcommission
on certain of these subjects:
Emigration: five in favor, six against, and seven not voting.
Geodetic questions: six in favor, seven against, and five not
voting.
Patents, etc.: four in favor, nine against, and five not voting.
Civil and commercial procedure: nine in favor, four against,
and five not voting.
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International private law: nine in favor, three against, and
six not voting.
Sanitary regulations: nine in favor, seven against, and two
not voting.
Regulations concerning epizooty, etc.: eight in favor, six
against, and four not voting.
The voting was influenced, doubtless, in some cases by considerations of a diplomatic nature for ulterior purposes in the
deliberations of the Conference as a whole. The failure of the
Conference, however, to agree on even a slight classification of
differences suitable for international adjudication is of the deepest significance. The principal reasons for this failure to agree
are the following:
I. Nations find it easier to enter into special agreements than
into general agreements of a universal character. Countries
whose interests are in no way in conflict, which, by reason of
geographical location, if for no other reason, are in no great
danger ever of going to war with each other, may find but little
difficulty in agreeing on a comprehensive list of questions they
will submit to arbitration, even to obligatory arbitration. Denmark and Portugal may so agree; Norway and the Argentine
Republic; Spain and Siam; Holland and Switzerland. Even
contiguous nations enjoying friendly relations, such as Canada
and the United States, or Germany and Austria, may go a long
way in these respects.
The situation is obviously different when it concerns a treaty
between Denmark and Germany; Portugal and Spain; Brazil and
the Argentine; Germany and France; or Holland and Belgium.
The conflicts of interests of an economic or territorial kind that
may arise between near neighbors, or between rival competitors
for commercial and strategic advantages, such as coaling stations and naval bases, preclude a detailed and comprehensive
classification of questions suited for international adjudication.
It is a good rule of international intercourse as well as of ordinary business transactions to be sure of what you are pledging,
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and to pledge no more than you are prepared to fulfill. This is
the dictate of good will and good faith, as well as of prudence.
With respect to general treaties of a universal kind between
many signatories, the engagements entered into must of necessity
be in general guarded terms, subject to diverse interpretations
and controversies, or qualified by the customary devitalizing reservations concerning vital interests, independence, and honor.
The Hague Conference of 19o7 demonstrated the extreme
difficulty of securing precise agreements that do not open the
door to serious differences of interpretation. It revealed the
fact that nations are compelled to take into account the factors
of sympathy, confidence, and good faith. They necessarily
prefer to choose with the greatest care those other nations with
which they are willing to negotiate precise agreements of momentous significance. They cannot put into general treaties of a
universal character the engagements they may be willing to
promise in individual treaties with a single other nation. Statesmen animated with generous sentiments and *fine idealism are in
no way warranted in gambling recklessly with the precious interests of millions of their nationals. Such an attitude, no matter how generous, is quite likely, in the long run, to compromise
and discredit the very cause they may have most at heart.
II. This unwillingness to enter into specific pledges by general treaties is a difficulty of a subjective kind which may be
overcome through increasing confidence and mutual good will.
A difficulty of a much more serious sort is the utter impossibility
of arriving at a satisfactory distinction between questions of a
legal nature and questions of a political nature.
We may resort to generalizations and say that certain matters, such as the moral right of a people to a separate political
existence, or the protection of the economic and commercial interests of a nation, are of a political character. So likewise we
may.reserve questions of national policy like the Monroe Doctrine and questions of domestic jurisdiction like immigration,
as being primarily political and non-legal in their nature. We
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may say that questions to which no accepted principles of international law apply are ipso facto unsuited for legal settlement.
Such generalizations are of slight value, however, in the
absence of authoritative tests and criteria to enable us to classify
a given controversy under its appropriate heading. They thus
lead only to fresh discussion and contention.
Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, one of the most distinguished delegates at the Hague Conference of 1907, in commenting on the scheme for making arbitration obligatory in matters of a legal order, observed:
"What is the meaning of tMis word? It has been said
that it may exclude 'political matters.' Now it is absolutely
impossible, in a world treaty, to trace a line of demarcation
between these two notions. A question may be legal in one
country, and political in another one. There are even
purely legal matters which become political at the time of a
dispute. One of our most distinguished colleagues told us
the other day, on another occasion that 'politics is the realm
of international law.' Do we desire to distinguish 'legal'
questions from technical and economic questions? This
would also be impossible. The result is that the word
'legal' states everything and states nothing, and in matters
of interpretation the result is just the same. It has been
asked: Who is to decide in case of some dispute, whether
a question is or whether it is not legal? So far we have had
no answer. Yet, this word 'legal' is the nail on which we
have hung the whole system of obligatory arbitration. . .
If this nail is not solidly fastened, everything hung on it will
fall to the ground." 2
Attention was drawn by another delegate to the fact that
even the interpretation of the clause of a treaty relating to railroad tariffs might imply a non-justiciable question if, for example, freight cars are held back for use in military mobilization
at a moment of great tension in diplomatic relations.
It is true that many international controversies contain what
Doctor Wehberg has termed a "legal core." "It is just as true,
however, to say that many legal questions have a political core.
'Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, Vol. II, p. so.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 27S

This fact was amply demonstrated in the discussions and the
conclusions of the First Commission of the Second Hague Peace
Conference. Doctor Drago of the Argentine Republic declared
that it was inacceptable that laws directed against epizooty or
other diseases of animals or of plants should be submitted to
arbitration! And M. Ruy Barbosa of Brazil "could not admit.
that a State might be constrained to submit to arbitration questions which, in its opinion engaged its essential interests; it
should remain itself the judge.as to the existence of these interests." 3
This would seem to be entifely exact even though an unpleasant truth. The fostering and the protection of national interests may not be transferred with safety or propriety from the
hands of the peoples immediately concerned. The reconciling of
conflicting interests is a task for diplomacy, not for courts of
justice. Everything-for the sake of justice and of peace--depends ultimately on the free exercise by a nation of its independent judgment and voluntary consent.
In view of all these considerations, to attempt to draw up
a rigid classification of legal questions which shall be automatically submitted to international adjudication is impossible, futile,
and undesirable. No definite and permanent distinction can be
made with any safety. If even a small list were agreed upon, as
indicated above, the matters treated would be on the whole of
a negligible character. And the questions which are most likely
to disturb the peace of nations are those peculiarly political questions involving control of raw products, of markets, of strategic
ports, and other similar problems affecting national trade and
movements of populations. Any classification of disputes, under
these circumstances, becomes more or less academic and valueless.
III. Another reason why classification is impossible is the
absence of accepted principles of international law to apply to
various important categories of human interests as, for example,
Idem.
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the rights of aliens, the civil and the penal responsibilities of
States towards foreigners, and the rights of foreign creditors of
nations that do not carry out their obligations. These are all
weighty matters, and yet the law of nations is lamentably deficient in these respects.
A serious divergence of opinion developed in the Advisory
Commissions of Jurists on the Permanent Court of International
Justice concerning this question whether the Court should assume
jurisdiction in cases where no principles and rules of law applied. Air. Root and Lord Phillimore, representing on the one
hand, the common law system of jurisprudence, strenuously insisted that an international court of justice should never have
the right to legislate. M. Loder and M. de Lapradelle, however,
representing, on the other hand, the continental system of jurisprudence, quite as strenuously insisted that large powers should
be given to a court in order that there should never be a denial of
justice. M. de Lapradelle said: "it is not possible to admit a
declaration of non-liquet by an international court; a denial of
justice must be excluded from the international court just as from
national courts."'
Lord Phillimore emphasized the contrast between these two
schools of jurisprudence in the following language:
"In his view these divergences arose from the continental idea of justice; at the outset strict limitations are
imposed on the judges; then through fear of restricting them
too much they are given complete freedom within these
limits. The English system is different: the judge takes an
oath 'to do justice according to law.'" 5
It would be unfortunate if this divergence of views on so
important a question were to be regarded as essentially a divergence of opposing schools of jurisprudence. While it is inevitable that international law should be approached from differing
angles of national schools of jurisprudence, we are in duty bound
'Proc~s-Verbaux
Jurists, etc., p. 312.
'Idtm, p. 35.

of the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of
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to analyze it scientifically and objectively. The law of nations,it must constantly be reiterated-is sui genris. It must not be
obscured by inaccurate analogies drawn from particular systems
of law. We should recall the basic characteristic of international
law, namely, that it rests upon common consent freely given;
that it is not imposed either by sovereign executive authority or
even by a supreme court of justice. It is thus fundamentally
unlike other law.
That there is some force to the arguments of Mr. Root and
Lord Phillimore was indicated by certain admissions of M. Loder,
(afterwards President of the World Court) in discussing the
proposition of Baron Descamps for the establishment of a High
Court of International Justice to judge international crimes.
"M. Loder was inclined to think that, in wishing to
establish a Court for the trial of international crimes, the
President was beginning at the wrong end of the problem. He

recalled Beccaria's rule 'NulIa pcna sine prevaia lege poenali,'
and asked what system of law should be applied by the new
Court. He acknowledged that law could be formulated and,
like M. Altamira, thought that it would be useful to do so.
The President's plan, however, suggested the establishment
of a Court before defining the law to be applied by it.
Crimes were mentioned in it which were not yet defined.
Under such circumstances the Court could only be of a
political nature; especially as each State would be represented by a judge.
"M. Loder was in favour of the gradual extension of the
jurisdiction of the permanent Court, the organization of
which they were now planning, but he was absolutely opposed to the idea of the application of undefined penalties
to undefined crimes by a political Court." 6
It would appear that this objection against the power of
an international tribunal to legislate in the absence of principles
of law applicable to the litigation is fundamental. Nationals cannot expose their interests to the subjective notions of jurists of
diverse national schools of thought. They must have assented
Idem, p. 5o4.
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in advance to the principles of law to be invoked in a given controversy. Such principles may not safely be imposed by the
arbitrary decision of a supreme international court.
It follows that all classification of disputes suitable for judicial review is impossible so long as States remain uncertain concerning the exact nature of the law to be applied. Every wrong
should have its remedy. The absence of legislation or of generally accepted principles on which to base a remedy does not imply
the right of a tribunal to act either as a legislator or as an autocrat. The wisdom of granting such great power over nations
-nay at least be seriously questioned.
IV. Another difficulty in the way of classification is the
uncertainty concerning the nature and the efficiency of the international tribunals which might have jurisdiction in certain categories of disputes, such as pecuniary claims against States, and
cases involving international private law. These are matters of
a technical nature requiring tribunals specially constituted to
render proper decisions, particularly if the international court
should function as a court of appeal with respect to decisions of
national courts.
This objection, however, is of lesser importance as involving a matter of procedure rather than of principle. It may be
met in the process of time by the development of competent tribunals commanding general confidence.
V. Still another objection is that, in indicating a list of controversies suitable for judicial decision, the effect would be virtually to create a code of international law on the principle of
nulla pcena siiw prtevia lege poenadi. To state that a question is
justiciable implies the existence of principles generally recognized
and accepted.
A code of international law in the sense of a comprehensive
well articulated system of principles and rules such as a Code
Napoleon may be impossible of creation. Codification, however,
viewed as the progressive enlargement of the law of nations
would appear feasible and desirable. In so far as this process
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would result in the indication of remedies for international
wrongs, it would undoubtedly facilitate recourse to international
justice.
The preceding rapid survey of the principal difficulties in
the way of the classification of international disputes may serve to
bring out into higher relief the undoubted fact that nations actuated by the highest ideals and generous motives are considerably
restricted by the very nature of things. They may abhor war
and desire justice, and yet, because of their conflicts of essential interests and honest differences .of opinions concerning rights
and remedies, they are often bewildered and embarrassed. An
equitable, if not a strictly legal, adjustment of their differences
is not infrequently most difficult, or even, impossible of attainment. The question then becomes one of evaluating justly the
various agencies and methods available for the peaceful settlement of these differences.
Philip Marshall Brown.
Princeton University.

